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IN THE LATE SUMMER OF 2007, public school officials in North
Chicago turned away Latino school children seeking to register for
the fall.' The officials refused to enroll the students because their par-
ents did not provide proof of legal residency or work authorization. 2
After intervention by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund ("MALDEF"), the school district reversed its decision and
allowed the children to register.3 Although the Chicago school dis-
trict's action violated established law, other school districts have taken
similar actions, and some states have attempted to pass legislation to
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the same effect.4 These actions target the estimated 1.8 million un-
documented children in this country5 and seek to undo the 1982 Su-
preme Court case, Plyler v. Doe,6 which established the right of
undocumented children to attend public school.
Plyler examined the issue of the rights of undocumented children
to attend public school under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 While re-
affirming the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, this Article offers an
alternative way to analyze the issue. It examines the extent to which
the Thirteenth Amendment can be used to guarantee access to public
education for the children of undocumented workers. It argues that
the Thirteenth Amendment can provide a powerful tool for litigation,
moral persuasion, and organizing in support of these children. View-
ing access to education for children of undocumented workers
through a Thirteenth Amendment lens reveals an important way in
which this group of workers could suffer a situation that replicates the
evils society sought to prohibit with the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude... shall exist in the United States."8 As a growing num-
ber of courts and authors have recognized, the Thirteenth
Amendment does more than prohibit chattel slavery as practiced in
the South prior to the Civil War.9 According to the Amendment's leg-
islative history, social understanding, and legal doctrine, it also pro-
hibits restrictive labor arrangements that replicate the harms of
slavery-the "badges and incidents" of slavery. 10 Examining how the
Thirteenth Amendment applies to modern day situations provides the
opportunity for society and the judiciary to realize these original
aspirations.11
4. See infra Part I.
5. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHO-
RIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY (2007) (estimating that according to the 2005 census, 1.8 million un-
documented children resided in the United States).
6. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
7. Id. at 205.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The second section of the amendment authorizes
Congress to enact legislation pursuant to this mandate. Id. § 2.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment:
Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 924 (2007).
11. Analysis of the legislative history which supports this expansive reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment can be found in James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom,
106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997); Benjamin P. Quest, Comment, Process Theory and Emerging Thir-
teenth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Case of Agricultural Guest Workers, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 233
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This Article rests on the theory that the institutionalized treat-
ment of undocumented immigrant workers1 2 in the United States has
become suspect under the Thirteenth Amendment. The presence and
treatment of undocumented workers in this country has become this
century's "peculiar institution." 1 3 They are a caste of workers of color,
laboring beneath the floor for free labor, denied the rights of citizen-
ship, and subject to human rights abuses. 14 Like slavery in the early
nineteenth century, the fact that the United States has a stated policy
against undocumented immigration and purportedly wants the un-
documented immigrants gone does not eliminate the facts that they
are here, that the state has set up a variety of structures that facilitate
their subordination, and that certain segments of society benefit from
their presence. In fact, this institution has been established through a
series of immigration and economic policies which encourage the
presence of this exploitable caste of workers. Like slavery after the
Civil War, the Constitution provides a legal framework for dismantling
that institution. To the extent that denial of education to the children
of undocumented workers becomes part-and-parcel of this peculiar
institution, the Thirteenth Amendment should prohibit it.
Part I of this Article discusses the current legal and social situa-
tion of undocumented students and their access to public education.
It focuses on the Fourteenth Amendment analysis of the issue, as de-
veloped in Plyler, and it also discusses the subsequent interpretations,
challenges, and affirmations of Plyler. Part II examines an alternative
legal approach to the issue, and it presents a re-imagined version of
Plyler. The re-imagined opinion incorporates both the original lan-
guage of the opinion, as well as additional language based on Thir-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence that supports the outcome. Part III
examines the Thirteenth Amendment justification in more detail. It
presents a brief synopsis of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence in
general and as applied to educational rights for undocumented chil-
dren. This Part also looks to avenues beyond litigation for using the
(2006); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
437 (1989).
12. Other articles have argued that the institutionalized treatment of legal immigrant
workers, on certain types of visas, also runs afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. See On-
tiveros, supra note 10. This Article focuses exclusively on the treatment of undocumented
workers.
13. The phrase "peculiar institution" refers to the system of slavery in the southern
states of the United States. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DicriONARY (Erin McKean ed., 2d
ed. 2005) available at Oxford Reference Online.
14. Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World-Organizing
Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 654-55 (2004).
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Thirteenth Amendment to guarantee the educational rights of un-
documented children by focusing upon its use as a moral call and an
organizational tool.
I. The Current Legal and Social Landscape Regarding
Undocumented Children and Access to Public
Education
A. Plyler v. Doe
In September of 1977, schools in Smith County, Texas told chil-
dren of Mexican origin they had two options if they wanted to join
their classmates at school that year: they had to provide legal docu-
mentation of their right to reside in the United States or pay $1000.15
Laura Alvarez and her siblings did not have the documents required
by Smith County, and the Alvarez family did not have the economic
means to pay for education, so the children could no longer attend
school. 16 The Alvarez children were not alone in their predicament,
so they brought suit in federal court along with three other families. 17
Five years later, in the landmark case of Plyler v. Doe, the United States
Supreme Court struck down the Texas statute which had authorized
Texas schools to exclude undocumented children and prohibited any
state funding to be spent on the education of undocumented chil-
dren. 18 The Court found the statute unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Under traditional Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, state
action is subject to "strict scrutiny" by the courts when the state action
targets a "suspect class" (such as a racial group) or affects a "funda-
mental right" (such as the right to marry).20 State actions in this cate-
gory must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in
order to be upheld. 21 Most other state actions, those not targeting a
suspect class or affecting a fundamental right, need only pass "rational
basis" scrutiny-the action just needs to be rationally related to a legit-
imate state interest to pass constitutional muster under the Four-
15. Barbara Belejack, A Lesson in Equal Protection, TEX. OBSERVER, July 13, 2007, http:/
/www.texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=2548.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
19. Id.
20. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
21. Id.
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teenth Amendment. 22 The Court has also carved out a narrow
intermediate category to evaluate state actions "based on sex or illegit-
imacy" which receive a "heightened" standard of scrutiny, somewhere
between strict scrutiny and rational basis. 23
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Plyler appears to place state
action depriving undocumented children access to public schools in
this intermediate category. 24 He justified this intermediate level of
scrutiny by casting education as a type of quasi-fundamental right, stat-
ing that education is not "merely some governmental benefit indistin-
guishable from other forms of social welfare legislation."25 He went on
to say that "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."2 6 Fur-
ther, the class of plaintiffs deserved unique protection for two reasons.
First, the children were part of a "caste of undocumented resident
aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor,
but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available
to citizens and lawful residents."2 7 Second, the children were being
singled out and punished not for their own actions, but for the actions
of their parents. 28 For all these reasons, the Court used intermediate
scrutiny.
Applying the intermediate standard, Justice Brennan declared
that the State had not demonstrated that the Texas law would further
the State's purported goals of relieving economic burdens on the
State, improving "the overall quality of education in the State," or en-
suring Texas resources benefit Texas rather than some other local-
ity.2 9 The Court's conclusion that the record did not support such a
finding has lead to vigorous research and debate on the educational
and societal costs and benefits of Plyler over the past twenty-five
years.3 0
The heightened level of Fourteenth Amendment analysis used in
Plyler has been criticized because undocumented immigrants do not
22. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17.
23. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988).
24. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 (requiring Texas to show a "substantial interest"), 218
n.16 (characterizing the analysis as "intermediate scrutiny").
25. Id. at 221.
26. Id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
27. Id. at 218-19.
28. Id. at 220.
29. Id. at 229.
30. Nina Rabin et al., Understanding Plyler's Legacy: Voices from Border Schools, 37 J.L. &
Eouc. 15, 17 (2008) (presenting "a more complex accounting of Plyles effects than usually
characterizes the public debate over its costs and benefits").
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fit neatly into the category of a "suspect class" and because the Su-
preme Court has held that the right to education is not necessarily a
fundamental right.31 Critics argue, as Justice Burger stated in his dis-
sent, " [B]y patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed
quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court
spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases."'32 Al-
though the opinion has withstood attack and been reaffirmed, 33 this
potential weakness concerns advocates of educational rights for un-
documented children.
B. An Overview of the Situation Since Plyler
1. The Social Landscape: Two Million Reasons Why Plyler Is Still
Important
Upholding Plyler remains vitally important. Plyler is as relevant to-
day as it was in 1982 when the Supreme Court held that Texas could
not deny education to its undocumented children, including the
more than 10,000 children living in the Houston area who were at the
heart of Plyler.34 At the time of the opinion, over 400,000 undocu-
mented residents in the United States were under the age of eigh-
teen. 35 Today that number approaches two million.3 6 These children
are part of a total undocumented population in the United States
numbering more than eleven million.3 7
The children impacted by Plyler today vary significantly from their
counterparts in 1982. Approximately twelve percent live with siblings
who are citizens.3 8 A little more than half immigrated to the United
31. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973).
32. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, J., dissenting).
33. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285-87 (1986). This Article does not suggest that
Plyler v. Doe was decided incorrectly. It is the firm belief of the authors that the decision, as
currently written, is correct. This section merely seeks to suggest areas that are subject to
attack and to suggest an alternative way to arrive at the same correct outcome.
34. Estevan T. Flores, Research on Undocumented Immigrants and Public Policy: A Study of
the Texas School Case, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 505, 506, 517 (1984).
35. Jeffrey S. Passel & Karen A. Woodrow, Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immi-
grants: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State, 18 INT'L MIGRA-
TION REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 642, 662 (1984).
36. PASSEL, supra note 5 (estimating that according to the 2005 census, 1.8 million
undocumented children resided in the United States).
37. Id.
38. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS, BACKGROUND BRIEFING PREPARED FOR TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND
AMERICA'S FUTURE 20 (2005).
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States from Mexico.3 9 Although the most undocumented children
probably reside in California,40 there are signs that states in the South
have seen the largest increases in recent years. 4 1 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, some scholars estimate that a higher percentage of undocu-
mented students graduate from high school than do minority students
who are citizens.4 2 These undocumented children include some of
the best and the brightest our nation has to offer.43 Regardless of how
this nation chooses to treat these children, it will continue to benefit
from their presence.
2. The Legal Landscape: A Fundamental Right to Minimally
Adequate, But Not Necessarily Equal, Education
In Brown v. Board of Education,44 the Supreme Court stated that
access to education, "where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms."45 The
Court would later construe Brown's promise of equal education much
more narrowly than was initially hoped for by minority communities.
Despite the setbacks to equal education, Supreme Court cases since
Brown do continue to suggest that a fundamental right to a minimally
adequate education does exist, and that a total deprivation of access
would violate constitutional norms.
Perhaps the biggest blow to Brown's vision of equal education
came in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,46 where the
Supreme Court upheld a Texas school finance system which created
gross disparities between schools located in wealthy neighborhoods
39. PASSEL, supra note 5 (estimating that fifty-seven percent of all undocumented re-
sidents originate from Mexico).
40. See FORTUNY ET AL., URBAN INST., THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMI-
GRANTS IN CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES COUNTY, AND THE UNITED STATES vi (2007).
41. PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE NEW LATINO SOUTH: THE CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES OF
RAPID POPULATION GROWTH 4 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.
php?ReportD=50 (showing the largest increases in the Latino population in southern
states). North Carolina, for example, experienced almost a 400% increase in its Latino
population during the 1990s. Id.
42. ORFIELD ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV. & URBAN INST., LOSING
OUR FUTURE: HOW MINORITY YOUTH ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE
CRISIS (2004).
43. Four undocumented students from Hayden High School in Phoenix won an es-
teemed national robotics competition. Soon after their success they were arrested while
crossing the Canadian border on a class trip. Peter Carlson, Stinky the Robot, Four Kids and a
Brief Whiff of Success, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2005, at Cl.
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45. Id. at 493.
46. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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and those in poor minority neighborhoods. 47 Because fifty percent of
a school's resources were collected from local property taxes, the ten
school districts with the lowest minority populations received more
than double the funding per child than the districts which were home
to the highest minority populations. 48 The Court declared that strict
scrutiny of the Texas finance system was unnecessary because it did
not target a suspect class, and a right to equal educational oppor-
tunites is not a fundamental right.49
Despite the result reached in Rodriguez, the Court did leave a
small opening for future progress. The Court emphasized that it was
not presented with a factual situation involving a school system that
failed "to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and
of full participation in the political process. '50 Rather, the opinion
only addressed a system involving "relative differences in spending
levels" between school districts.5 1 The Court widened that very open-
ing with its decision in Plyler. Later, the Court declared that Rodriguez
and Plyler have not "definitively settled the questions whether a mini-
mally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a stat-
ute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded
heightened equal protection review."52
In 1988, the Court again refused to foreclose a fundamental
rights analysis for access to a basic education when it decided Kadrmas
v. Dickenson Public Schools.53 In that case the Court held that North
Dakota schools could require rural residents to pay eleven percent of
the transportation costs for their children.54 Further, pursuant to this
decision, the Dickenson Public Schools could deny transportation to
Sarita Kadrmas when her parents would not pay the transportation
fee.55 Although the holding again encroached on the right to equal
educational opportunities, as the dissent pointed out, the majority
opinion stressed "that the denial of transportation to Sarita Kadrmas
did not in fact prevent her from receiving an education" because
47. Id. at 54-55.
48. See id. at 15 n.38.
49. Id. at 28-29.
50. Id. at 37.
51. Id.
52. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (refusing to resolve the issue of
whether a fundamental right exists and remanding to resolve whether the unequal distri-
bution of funding was constitutional under a rational basis theory).
53. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
54. Id. at 454-56.
55. Id. at 454.
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Sarita's family was able to secure transportation for her.56 Justice Mar-
shall's dissent went on to state, "[T]he Court therefore does not ad-
dress the question whether a State constitutionally could deny a child
access to a minimally adequate education."5 7
As the Supreme Court noted in Plyler, its jurisprudence has a long
history of finding that education holds a unique place among state
services. 58 Although Rodriguez demonstrates that the Court is not will-
ing to declare equal education a fundamental right, it may be willing
to find that "some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system
if we are to preserve freedom and independence." 59 As such, the
Court should find that a fundamental right exists if confronted with a
situation involving a total deprivation of education.
3. The Legislative Landscape: Skirmishes at the Federal, State, and
Local Levels
Despite the Supreme Court's rulings, hard work remains for
those who wish to secure educational access for all children in the
United States. As one commentator put it, the real fight has come in
enforcing Plyler locally.60 Numerous incursions on educational rights,
both legislatively and administratively, have required advocates to de-
fend the progress made by Plyler.
a. Federal Legislation
In 1996, the so-called "Gallegly Amendment" sought to permit
"states to deny public education benefits to certain aliens not lawfully
present in the United States."'6 1 The amendment failed in part due to
a congressional compromise, in part due to President Clinton's veto
threat, and in part due to opposition emanating from unlikely
sources, such as the two Texas Republican senators at the time.62 In-
deed this indicates Texas has made progress since Plyler, with consid-
56. Id. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 466 n.I.
58. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
59. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
60. Many of the developments noted in this section were discovered through an in-
sightful article written by Professor Michael Olivas. For a more in-depth look, see Michael
A. Olivas, Immigration Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper
Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 36-45.
61. H.R. 4134, 104th Cong. (1996).
62. PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATrLE TO SAVE
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 185, 245, 311 n.33 (2000).
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erable educational programs aimed at improving the experience of
migrant children in the Texas school system.63
A federal statute enacted in 1996 prohibits foreign parents from
sending their children to the United States to live with relatives or
sponsors in order to obtain education for the children.64 Providing
some insight into issues that might arise under the statute, in 1997 an
Illinois court interpreted a similar state statute to find that a school
could not refuse to accept a document notarized by a judge in Mexico
granting custodial rights to a child's aunt in Illinois.
65
b. State Legislation
One of the most famous state level attempts to restrict the rights
of undocumented immigrants occurred in 1994, when fifty-nine per-
cent of California's voters passed Proposition 18766 ("Prop 187"). The
referendum affected life for undocumented residents at nearly every
conceivable point of contact with the California government. 67 A key
provision banned undocumented children from public education.68 A
federal judge found almost all aspects of Prop 187 unconstitutional
based on either Plyler or preemption grounds.69 After appealing the
case, the litigants settled the matter before the Ninth Circuit could
rule on the substantive matters of the claim. 70
In the first half of 2006, more than 500 immigration-related bills
were introduced in state legislatures. Forty-four of the bills were en-
acted in nineteen states.71 Although not all of the bills were restrictive
in nature, some were drastically so. 7 2 While these types of state bills
are not new, the flurry of activity does give some cause for alarm.
63. Olivas, supra note 60, at 40-41.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(m) (2000).
65. Joel R. v. Bd. of Educ., 686 N.E.2d 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
66. See Bill Jones, Cal. Sec'y of State, Statement of the Vote: November 8, 1994 Gen-
eral Election, at 111 (Nov. 8, 1994) (reporting that California voters approved Proposition
187 by a fifty-nine to forty-one percent margin).
67. See Lolita K Buckner Innis, California's Proposition 187-Does It Mean What It Says?
Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 577
(1996).
68. California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election November 8, 1994, at 92 (Nov. 8
1994) (adding Cal Educ. Code § 48215(a)).
69. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
70. Patrickj. McDonnell, Davis Won't Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles, L.A.
TIMES, July 29, 1999, at Al.
71. Olivas, supra note 60, at 31.
72. See id. at 32 n.15.
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c. Local Level Activity
Since schools are administering the law at the local level, their
policies and procedures can indirectly affect access to education.
Michael Olivas points out that attorneys for MALDEF "have had to file
several dozen actions since the early 1980s to enforce Plylers clear
holding, including combating school board actions requiring Social
Security numbers [and] school requests for driver's licenses to iden-
tify parents ... designed to identify immigration status or single out
undocumented children." 73 Virginia recently recognized the dangers
associated with requiring the use of social security numbers and
passed legislation forbidding such use.74
Some local challenges to Plyler have been more direct. In the Illi-
nois school system, a school board refused admission to a student on
the ground that her family's B-2 tourist visa expired.75 The Elmwood
Park School Board, however, revised its policy after the state's board
of education threatened to withhold funding.76 As discussed in the
introduction to this Article, in 2007 a school district in northern Chi-
cago also attempted to turn away children based on similar grounds.
Other challenges have taken on a brutal tone. In 1992, INS au-
thorities harassed students suspected of being undocumented at
Bowie High School, near the border in El Paso. 77 The Border Patrol
made their presence known by "driving over the football practice field
and baseball diamond, entering the football locker rooms, surveilling
with binoculars from the football stadium, and using binoculars to
watch flag girls practicing on campus." 78 Authorities routinely sub-
jected the students to "indecent comments, obscene gestures, and hu-
miliation in the presence of their ...friends, family, and relevant
community. ' 79 The aggression reached a high point when some stu-
dents, along with a school coach, were detained at gunpoint.80
73. Id. at 39.
74. 2003 Va. Acts 637 (amending Section 22.1-260 of the Code of Virginia).
75. Rosalind Rossi, State Strips Schools of $3.5 million: District Following Law, It Claims, by
Refusing to Enroll Immigrant, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at News-8.
76. Eric Herman, Elmwood Park Schools Reinstated: District Agrees to Stop Barring Students
Due to Immigration Status, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at A3; Colleen Mastony & Diane
Redo, Elmwood Park Schools Give In; To Keep State Funds, District Drops Fight on Immigrant
Student, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2006, at News-1.
77. Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 490-96 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
78. Id. at 495.
79. Id. at 501.
80. Id. at 491.
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In 2004, administrators at a school in northern New Mexico
turned three of its own students over to the Border Patrol when it
found the students just beyond school grounds.81 The students filed a
complaint in federal court claiming that the school, the Albuquerque
Police Department, and Border Patrol violated the students' constitu-
tional rights, including the right to attend public school.8 2 The stu-
dents agreed to a settlement requiring the district to stop the illegal
practices, educate its personnel regarding the rights of immigrant stu-
dents, and create a liaison for immigrant parents. 8 3
In 2006, "mixed evidence" arose showing Immigration and Cus-
toms ("ICE") agents came onto school grounds in Austin, Texas to
apprehend the children of parents arrested on suspicion of being in
the country illegally.8 4 Similar reports surfaced the following year in
Austin, 85 as well as in Santa Fe, New Mexico.8 6 Recent evidence from
2008 suggests that ICE could be stepping up its antagonism of the
undocumented population.8 7 In California, an exemplary student and
immigrant rights activist at Palomar College was arrested and de-
ported, along with her mother and father.88
On the other hand, many local communities appreciate and sup-
port the ideas found in Plyler.s9 One recent survey of school personnel
in six Arizona public schools found that the vast majority of personnel
with an opinion on the issue supported the law established by Plyler
and believed "a law prohibiting undocumented students from attend-
ing public schools would have a negative (36%) or very negative
(35%) impact on the relationship between their school and the
community."90
81. Amy Miller, APS Safe for Migrant Students, ALBUQ. J., June 2, 2006, at Al.
82. Amy Miller, Migrants Are Safe at APS, ALBUQ. J., June 15, 2006, at Cl.
83. Id.
84. Texas Civil Rights Project Newsclip, Email Warns of Illegal Immigration Crack-
downs in Classrooms (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/newspub/
clip_060426_email warns.html.
85. Katie Humphrey, Parents Without ID Denied Access to Del Valle Schools, New Policy Pro-
tects Students, District Says, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 8, 2007, at B1.
86. Raam Wong, ICE Picks up Dad at School, ALBuQ. J., Mar. 29, 2007, at Al; Raam
Wong, State Police Apologize to School; ICE Agents Arrested Chaparral Student's Dad, ALBUQ. J.,
Apr. 7, 2007, at Al.
87. ICEArrests MEChA President and Her Family, LA Voz DE AZTLAN,Jan. 17, 2008, http:/
/www.aztlan.net/mecha.president-arrested.htm.
88. Id.
89. See Rabin et al., supra note 30, at 42.
90. Id.
[Vol. 42
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
11. Plyler v. Doe Re-imagined
Plyler and its progeny address the issue of providing education to
undocumented children as a Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion issue. This section presents an alternate version of key sections of
the Plyler opinion, based on the Thirteenth Amendment. The alterna-
tive version includes both language from the existing opinion, as well
as additional language based on Thirteenth Amendment doctrine.
The new language is italicized. All citations found in the original opin-
ion have been omitted. The re-imagined opinion addresses the two
potential problems with the current opinion described above: the
need for a "suspect class" and the need to identify a "fundamental
right" for equal protection analysis.
The re-imagined opinion also addresses a third problem with Ply-
ler as currently written: its reaffirmation of the so-called plenary pow-
ers doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court refuses to
review congressional action in the area of immigration.9' In order for
a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to a federal immigration policy
penalizing undocumented workers or their children to prevail, the
plenary powers doctrine must be overturned.92
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
Re-imagined (2008)
The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent with
the Thirteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented school-
age children the free public education that it provides to children
who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.
I
Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted immi-
gration into this country. Unsanctioned entry into the United States is
a crime, and those who have entered unlawfully are subject to depor-
tation. But despite the existence of these legal restrictions, a substan-
tial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering the
United States, and now live within various States, including the State
of Texas.
91. See GabrielJ. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitu-
tional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1998).
92. Immigration scholars have insistently called for a reversal of this policy. Id. at 7-8.
Some courts have made incursions into the doctrine. See, e.g., Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d
1467, 1470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1996), affd, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Giusto v. INS, 9 F.3d 8, 9-10 (2d
Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993); Campos v. INS,
961 F.2d 309, 316 (1st Cir. 1992).
Spring 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
II A (457 U.S. 218)
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry
into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar
to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the crea-
tion of a substantial "shadow population" of illegal migrants-num-
bering in the millions-within our borders. This situation raises the
specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, en-
couraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nev-
ertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to
citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an underclass
presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on ad-
herence to principles of equality under law. The Thirteenth Amendment
to the Constitution regulates the treatment of such a caste of workers.
Although often mistakenly assumed to be solely a ban on chattel slavery,
our decisions make clear that it reaches a much broader array of labor arrange-
ments and societal deprivations. As we stated in one of our first cases applying
the Thirteenth Amendment,
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Con-
gress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other
kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chi-
nese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or
Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be
trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the
States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of
these articles, that protection will apply, though the party inter-
ested may not be of African descent .... [I]t is necessary to look to
the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit of them
all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the process of
continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose was sup-
posed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accom-
plish it.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (36 Wall.), at 72 (1873).
In the twentieth century, we framed the issue broadly, "The plain
intention [of the amendment] was to abolish slavery of whatever
name and form and all its badges and incidents; to render impossi-
ble any state of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that
control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or
coerced for another's benefit, which is the essence of involuntary
servitude."
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1910).
The treatment of undocumented workers is suspect under the Thirteenth
Amendment because, like the labor arrangements discussed in these cases, their
peculiar situation leaves them without the ability to protect themselves in the
workplace. If they file claims for workplace treatment that falls below the statu-
[Vol. 42
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
tory floor set for free labor, they are subject to deportation and/or ineligible for
monetary remedies. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S.
137 (2002). In addition, like those subject to chattel slavery, debt peonage, and
vassalage, they are a group of workers of color who lack the social citizenship
rights necessary to improve their stature in the United States. Amici briefs have
documented the human rights abuses to which they are often subjected. Sarah
Cleveland et al., Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae
Brief: The United States Violates International Law When Labor Law
Remedies are Restricted Based on Workers' Migrant Status, 1 SeattleJ.
Soc. Just. 795 (2003).
The Thirteenth Amendment can and must tackle a broad range of race,
labor, and social issues when societal factors combine to create a caste of indi-
viduals (workers and their families) whose treatment replicates the harms which
the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to eliminate. Such is the situation of
undocumented workers and their families today. Any state or private action
which furthers the subordination of this caste of workers properly falls within
the ambit of the Thirteenth Amendment.
457 U.S. 221
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the
Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" in-
distinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child mark the
distinction. The "American people have always regarded education
and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme impor-
tance." We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of govern-
ment," and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on
which our society rests." "[A] s ... pointed out early in our history...
some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to partici-
pate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are
to preserve freedom and independence." In addition, education pro-
vides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically pro-
ductive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. In fact, its
denial was integral to the institution of slavery and the perpetuation of subordi-
nation of blacks following the Civil War. We cannot ignore the significant
costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.
In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our po-
litical and cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated
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group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Thirteenth
Amendment: the abolition of a caste or population unable to reap the rewards
of their own labor and succeed in society. Paradoxically, by depriving the
children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the
means by which that group might raise the level of esteem in which it
is held by the majority. But more directly, "education prepares individ-
uals to be self-reliant and sef-sufficient participants in society." Illiter-
acy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will
handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every
day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social,
economic, intellectual and psychological well-being of the individual,
and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most diffi-
cult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of
basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Thir-
teenth Amendment. What we said 28 years ago in Brown v. Board Of Edu-
cation still holds true:
Today education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsi-
bilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awaken-
ing the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may rea-
sonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu-
nity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.
B
These well-settled principles allow us to determine the unconstitu-
tionality of excluding undocumented children from public schools under the
Thirteenth Amendment. As we found in Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409
(1968), the Amendment prohibits not only the institutions of slavery and invol-
untary servitude, but also the "badges and incidents" of slavery. The denial of
education to slaves and their children was seen as necessary to the properfunc-
tioning of the institution of slavery. Following emancipation, the continued
denial of education to blacks was an integral part of the structures that perpetu-
ated the subordination of newly freed blacks and the generations which followed
them. Although public education is not a fundamental right, the denial of such
education to the children of undocumented workers is a "badge or incident" of
slavery properly prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.
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IV
It is the State's principal argument, and apparently the view of
the dissenting Justices, that the undocumented status of these chil-
dren vel non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them
benefits that a State might choose to afford other residents ....
457 U.S. 239
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish an uni-
form Rule of Naturalization." Drawing upon this power, upon its ple-
nary authority with respect to foreign relations and international
commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its
borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admis-
sion to our Nation and status within our borders. The obvious need
for delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to
avoid intrusion into this field. However, congressional power in the area of
immigration must not remain unfettered. To the extent that the plenary powers
doctrine has been read to foreclose judicial review of congressional authority in
matters relating to immigration, that policy is overstated. This conclusion is
particularly true in situations where the policy on immigration runs afoul of
other constitutional requirements and protections, such as those found in the
Thirteenth Amendment. Further, traditional caution does not persuade us
that unusual deference must be shown any state regulation on the educa-
tion of undocumented children. The States enjoy no power with respect to
the classifications of aliens.
III. A Thirteenth Amendment Right to Public Education for
Undocumented Children
The first clause of the Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the
United States .... -93 The second clause authorizes Congress to enact
legislation to carry out this mandate. 94 Two different ways to "read"
the Thirteenth Amendment and its jurisprudence have emerged over
time. The first "conservative," or literal, approach focuses on the two
prongs of the Amendment's first section: the "slavery" prong and the
"involuntary servitude" prong. The second "holistic" approach focuses
on the intent of the first section as a whole. Both approaches provide
93. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIII, § 1.
94. Much of the modern day Thirteenth Amendment case law, discussed below, ex-
amines whether Congress has authority under the second clause to pass legislation. The
situation described in this Article is different because it examines whether the Amend-
ment's first clause could be used to strike down state action.
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support for the re-imagined Plyler opinion. In addition, the two ap-
proaches complement each other by providing alternative justifica-
tions for either a litigation strategy or a moral persuasion and
organizing strategy in support of education for undocumented chil-
dren. This section begins with a brief summary of these two ap-
proaches and then applies them to the issue of educational access for
children of undocumented workers.
A. A Brief Summary of Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence
1. The Conservative or Literal Approach: The Supreme Court's
Two-Pronged Approach to the Thirteenth Amendment
The language of the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits "slavery" and "involuntary servitude. '95 Under the conserva-
tive approach, a court examines the two prongs of the Amendment
independently of one another.96 One way to organize the Supreme
Courtjurisprudence in this area is to divide the cases into those evalu-
ating whether a challenged practice constitutes involuntary servitude
and those prohibiting slavery.
The cases falling into the involuntary servitude line examine
whether a worker suffers employer or state "coercion" which prevents
him or her from terminating an employment relationship. 97 The deci-
sions from the early to mid part of the twentieth century struck down
cases of debt peonage and similar arrangements. 98 More recently,
workers' rights advocates have successfully lobbied for legislation,
based on the Thirteenth Amendment, to overturn a Supreme Court
case that limited the type of coercion constituting involuntary servi-
tude to physical coercion. 99 The legislation has been used to bring a
variety of cases involving trafficked workers in the United States. 100
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
96. Ontiveros, supra note 10, at 924.
97. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133
(1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1910).
98. See Pollock, 322 U.S. at 4; Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 133; Bailey, 219 U.S. at 219.
99. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-10 (2000)
(overturning United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)).
100. See, e.g., Maria L. Ontiveros, Female Immigrant Workers and the Law: Limits and Oppor-
tunities, in THE SEX OF CLASS: WOMEN TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LABOR 235, 245-48 (Doro-
thy Sue Cobble ed., 2007); Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day
Involuntary Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Traffick-
ing, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 941 (2007); Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking
Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WO-
MEN'S L.J. 1 (2004).
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The cases falling into the slavery line draw on very old Supreme
Court language. Shortly after the passage of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, the Court stated that the Amendment decreed "civil and politi-
cal freedom throughout the United States" and abolished not just
slavery, but all "badges and incidents of slavery." 10 1 This language lay
dormant for almost one hundred years. In 1968, in Jones v. Mayer,10 2
the Supreme Court used the Thirteenth Amendment to uphold a pro-
hibition on private discrimination in real estate sales. 103 It found that
prohibitions on the ability to own land were part-and-parcel of slavery,
and that continuing discrimination in the ability to own land contrib-
uted to continuing racial subordination. 10 4
The Supreme Court extended this finding in a number of other
cases. 10 5 In Griffin v. Breckenridge,106 the Court upheld the so-called Ku
Klux Klan Act, which protected the right to interstate travel from ra-
cially-motivated attacks. 10 7 In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,108 the
Court upheld a prohibition on racial discrimination in the formation
of employment contracts under the Thirteenth Amendment. 10 9 Fi-
nally, in Runyon v. McCrary,"1 0 the Supreme Court prohibited private
schools from discriminating on the basis of race, holding that such
discrimination was prohibited as a badge and incident of slavery and
constituted discrimination in the formation of contracts. In each of
these cases, the Supreme Court upheld legislation passed by Congress
pursuant to the slavery prong of the Thirteenth Amendment.
101. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
102. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
103. Id. at 439. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973). Jones and its progeny drew on the groundbreak-
ing scholarship of Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171
(1951).
104. Jones, 392 U.S. at 441-43.
105. Commentators have argued to extend these cases in a variety of other ways. See
Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response
to DeShaney, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1384-85 (1992);Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor:
Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
207, 239-43 (1991); Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Abusive Mail-Order Bride Marriage and the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 94 Nw. U. L. Rv. 1547, 1569-71 (2000).
106. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
107. Id. at 96.
108. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
109. Id. at 459-60.
110. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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2. Beyond the Two-Pronged Approach: The Holistic Approach
The second way to read the Thirteenth Amendment focuses on a
holistic approach, rather than a two-pronged approach.1 1 A holistic
approach to the Thirteenth Amendment argues that analyzing the
slavery and involuntary servitude prongs independently of one an-
other presents too narrow a reading of the history and social under-
standing of the Thirteenth Amendment. The holistic approach
examines the Amendment in its entirety and argues that the Amend-
ment prohibits arrangements that interfere with workers' rights, citi-
zenship rights, human rights, and civil rights, even outside the context
of slavery. Understood through its history, case law, and social mean-
ing, the Thirteenth Amendment did more than free and protect the
rights of slaves. It also sought to protect workers by providing a floor
for free labor, under which no worker may struggle." 2 In addition, it
sought to guarantee certain social citizenship rights. These social citi-
zenship rights, separate from paper citizenship and naturalization
rights, are similar to those rights denied freed blacks and sometimes
described as the badges and incidents of slavery in the slavery prong
cases of the conservative approach. 1 3 Last, but certainly not least, the
Amendment sought to protect society by ensuring the prohibition of
certain kinds of evils, which we often view today as human or civil
rights violations.' 14
The various commentators who use the conservative approach to
analyze the Thirteenth Amendment are not wrong in their interpreta-
tions; however, commentators can enrich Thirteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence by examining situations where all of the strands of the
Amendment come together. In addition, the holistic approach may
present the best avenue for reintroducing the concept of the Thir-
teenth Amendment as a moral framework for addressing the treat-
ment of undocumented workers. Finally, this holistic approach may
be the best way to support the cases, like the re-imagined Plyler, which
involve action by the courts striking down state action under the Thir-
111. This argument has been developed in Ontiveros, supra note 14, at 662-70 and was
expanded in Ontiveros, supra note 10, at 925.
112. SeeJames Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 944 (1997);
Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 443
(1989).
113. Ontiveros, supra note 10, at 924-25.
114. See generally Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil
Rights, 50 DuKE L.J. 1609 (2001), for a discussion of the use of the Thirteenth Amendment
to justify the African American civil rights agenda.
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teenth Amendment, rather than cases which uphold congressional au-
thority to pass legislation.
B. Analyzing the Denial of Education Using the Conservative
Approach to the Thirteenth Amendment
1. Frameworks for Applying the Conservative Approach
Within the conservative approach to the Thirteenth Amendment,
two authors have put forward frameworks to evaluate whether certain
deprivations run afoul of the slavery prong's prohibition on badges
and incidents of slavery. 1 5 William Carter looks at: (1) the connection
between the class to which the plaintiff belongs and the institution of
chattel slavery and (2) the connection between the complained-of in-
jury to the institution of slavery. 116 He argues that if the plaintiff is not
African American, or some other historical victim of class-based dis-
crimination, it is more difficult (but not impossible) to establish a
Thirteenth Amendment claim. 117 Other groups can establish claims
when the types of injuries or forms of discrimination practiced are
closely tied to the structures supporting or created by the system of
slavery.118
Alex Tsesis, on the other hand, focuses on the freedom and lib-
erty guaranteed by the Amendment's prohibition on slavery. He ar-
gues that the Amendment contains a negative prohibition against
social and economic injustices that abridge fundamental liberties, 11 9
including, but not limited to, the rights to make parental decisions, to
travel, and to enter into employment and real estate contracts, as well
as a positive grant of freedom.1 20 He emphasizes that the Amend-
ment's protection should not "stop at the disabilities existing contem-
poraneously with the passage of the amendment and the federal laws
115. The involuntary servitude prong of the conservative approach is not implicated in
either of the frameworks.
116. William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges
and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1318 (2007) [hereinafter Carter, Jr.,
Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment]; see also William M. Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of
Thirteenth Amendment Legislation: "Congruence and Proportionality" or "Necessary and Proper"?,
38 U. TOL. L. REV. 973 (2007) [hereinafter Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amend-
ment Legislation].
117. See generally Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 116;
Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amendment Legislation, supra note 116.
118. See generally Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 116;
Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amendment Legislation, supra note 116.
119. ALEX TSESis, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HIS-
TORY 89 (2004).
120. Id. at 96-97.
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that followed on its bootstraps. The broader question is whether there
continue to be indicia of servitude that interfere with the lives, liber-
ties, and well-being of persons within the United States... ,"121 Under
the Tsesis approach, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits such
interferences.
2. The Conservative Thirteenth Amendment Frameworks Applied
to the Denial of Education
Carter and Tsesis provide conservative approaches to defining
conduct prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment because their
analyses accept the Supreme Court's two-pronged approach to Thir-
teenth Amendment analysis and focus squarely on the slavery prong.
In addition, their analyses track, to some extent, Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis by looking at something akin to protected classes and
fundamental rights (Carter) or a constitutional guarantee of liberty
(Tsesis). Since these analyses track existing doctrine and may be most
acceptable to the Judiciary, their approaches might be the best start-
ing point in any litigation dealing with education for undocumented
school children.
The denial of education to children of undocumented workers
fits within either scholar's framework. Under the Carter approach, un-
documented workers and their children are very much like the class
of people harmed by chattel slavery. They are non-citizen workers of
color, laboring beneath the floor for free labor 122 and subjected to
violations of human, civil, and workplace rights. 123 As the Plyler opin-
ion noted, the confluence of government policies has resulted in
the existence of a large number of employed illegal aliens, such as
the parents of plaintiffs in this case, whose presence is tolerated,
whose employment is perhaps even welcomed, but who are virtu-
ally defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous neglect
to which the state or the state's natural citizens and business orga-
nizations may wish to subject them.124
All the Plyler opinions note the life-long nature of the caste to which
uneducated undocumented children would be confined.1 25
121. Id. at 96.
122. They labor beneath the floor for free labor because they lack access to the work-
place protections guaranteed to free workers. Ontiveros, supra note 14, at 673-74.
123. See id.
124. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.18.
125. Id. at 219, 230 (Marshall, J., concurring); 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 239
(Powell, J., concurring).
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Both the Carter and Tsesis approaches would look to the role
denial of education played in the institution of chattel slavery, the per-
petuation of racial subordination, and its impact on the freedom of
individuals. Denial of education was key to the institution of slavery,
and many states prohibited slaves from receiving any form of educa-
tion. 126 The systematic exclusion of blacks from education following
the Civil War perpetuated racial subordination. Henry Allen Bullock
shows how, following the Civil War, "the South, in keeping with its
traditional prejudices, hurriedly erected barriers against the realiza-
tion of two of the Negro's most pressing aspirations: the aim to be-
come a full-fledged citizen and the desire to educate his children."'' 2 7
Some states, such as North Carolina, closed black schools and made it
a crime to teach blacks how to read. 128 Other states, such as Florida,
imposed special taxes on blacks to maintain black schools.' 2 9 Most
blacks could not afford the taxes, and the inadequate funding led to
inadequate schools. Social pressures also impeded black children
from receiving education. 130
James Anderson describes the dominant type of education of-
fered to blacks as a unique form of second-class education to reinforce
the social oppression of black southerners. 3 1 The Hampton Normal
and Agricultural Institute, for example, was founded "to socialize
blacks to understand and accept their disenfranchisement and to
make them more productive laborers. ' 13 2 Slaves and ex-slaves, on the
other hand, possessed a fundamental belief in the value and power of
education and literacy as a method to attain true freedom, en-
franchisement, and equality. 13 3 Pamela Barnhouse Walters charts the
mechanisms used by whites to frustrate the desires of the freed slaves
and their descendents.13 4 By first disenfranchising blacks and then set-
126. TSESIS, supra note 119, at 124.
127. HENRY ALLEN BULLOCK, A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH: FROM
1619 TO THE PRESENT 38 (1967).
128. Id. at 38-40.
129. Id. at 40.
130. For example, whites who employed black servants would not allow them to work if
they attended school. Id. at 43. Existing schools were also subject to mob violence. Id.
131. JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935, at 8
(1988).
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id.
134. Pamela Barnhouse Walters, Educational Access and the State: Historical Continuities
and Discontinuities in Racial Inequality in American Education, 74 Soc. EDuc. (EXTRA ISSUE) 35
(2001).
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ring up a system of school resource allocation controlled by local offi-
cials, black children were excluded from decent education. 35
The denial of education to blacks and their children was part of
the method for perpetuating inequality and subordination. If states
seek to overrule Plyler and deny public education to the children of
undocumented workers, the denial would fit within the definition of
badges and incidents of slavery. Such denial would prevent the work-
ers and their children from becoming full members of society. It
would reinforce their status as caste-members without human or work-
place rights. It would prevent them from attaining the skills they need
to advocate for better working conditions or enfranchisement. It
would have the same effect (and could serve the same purpose) as the
denial of education to slaves and freed blacks. One advantage to using
this Thirteenth Amendment argument is that the state may not at-
tempt to justify the prohibition. The Amendment clearly states that
slavery shall not exist in the United States.13 6
Finally, the conservative approach to the Thirteenth Amendment
presents alternative congressional authority to pass progressive legisla-
tion affirming Plyler. Most of our important civil rights and workers'
rights legislation has been passed under congressional authority to
regulate interstate commerce. 137 Several commentators, however,
have argued that such an approach is not analytically satisfying. 138
From a practical standpoint, the Commerce Clause approach is be-
coming unsuccessful. Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court
has restricted the ability of Congress to pass legislation under the
Commerce Clause. 139 Nor should Congress rely on its plenary powers
found in immigration law, for the reasons discussed above. Therefore,
the broad grant of congressional authority, found in Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment,140 may be the best hope to pass progressive
135. Id.
136. The only exception found in the language of the Amendment is "as punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII,
§ 1.
137. Some legislation has been passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, but
the Supreme Court has consistently found that the Fourteenth Amendment only reaches
actions by state actors. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191
(1988). The Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand, reaches private action. The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21-23 (1883).
138. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: La-
bor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2002);
Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil
Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 1043-44 (2002).
139. See Pope, supra note 138.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
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legislation in the future. This approach also allows Congress to move
away from the plenary powers doctrine as its basis for legislation in
this area. Finally, since the Thirteenth Amendment reaches both pri-
vate and state action, it may provide a more powerful tool for future
legislative action than the Fourteenth Amendment, which only
reaches state action.
3. An Ancillary Approach: Strengthening the Fourteenth
Amendment Approach Using Thirteenth Amendment
Rights
Tsesis also provides another, slightly different framework to ad-
dress the issue of the educational rights of undocumented children.
He suggests the potential to link the items covered by the Fourteenth
Amendment's fundamental rights to the Thirteenth Amendment's
badges and incidents language.1 41 This approach could be used in ad-
dressing the critique of Plyler's Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Al-
though several Justices voiced the opinion that education is a
fundamental right, Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, recognized
the difficulty in finding a fundamental right that cannot be linked to a
specific part of the constitution. 142
Tsesis argues that education, in certain circumstances, is directly
implicated by the Thirteenth Amendment. 143 He describes a "series of
parental autonomy cases regarding educational issues [which] fit in
with the Thirteenth Amendment's criteria so well as to make it plausi-
ble that courts could find unconstitutional arbitrary restrictions on pa-
rental autonomy, even absent congressional action.' 44 These cases
include Meyer v. Nebraska,145 where the Supreme Court struck down a
state statute that prohibited schools from teaching a foreign language
in elementary school, 146 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,14 7 where the Court
invalidated a state law requiring compulsory school attendance until
the age of sixteen.' 48
Denial of education for undocumented children falls into this
category of parental autonomy because the denial interferes with the
parental rights of the undocumented adults. Interference with family
141. TSESIS, supra note 119, at 89.
142. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231-34 (1982).
143. TsEsIs, supra note 119, at 124-27.
144. Id. at 125.
145. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
146. Id. at 402.
147. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
148. Id. at 234.
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autonomy and denial of parents' rights to direct and control their
children were integral to slavery. 149 Tsesis argues that, rather than de-
ciding these cases on a general concept of fundamental rights un-
hinged from a specific constitutional protection, a Thirteenth
Amendment analysis
would reflect on the institutional denial of parental autonomy in
the antebellum United States and critically consider whether bar-
ring parents from particular educational or custody decisions re-
sembles the conditions of involuntary servitude. The liberation
from slavery extended to all parents the freedom to make critical
decisions about their children's education.150
Thus, the argument could be made that the denial of education
sometimes does implicate a fundamental right-the parental auton-
omy guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment-for Fourteenth
Amendment analysis. The argument would have to be made that state
prohibition on public education interferes with the parental rights of
undocumented workers. Even without this explicit link, however, sev-
eral Justices were willing to find in both Plyler and Rodriguez that edu-
cation is a fundamental right in general.15 1 OtherJustices were willing
to find a fundamental right in Plyler, despite Rodriguez, because Plyler
dealt with an absolute denial of education, and not just unequal edu-
cation. 152 The Thirteenth Amendment parental autonomy linkage
adds another potential fundamental rights approach under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Depending upon the composition of the Court,
the combination of these arguments may buttress the Plyler majority's
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Unlike the Thirteenth Amendment
approach, under the Fourteenth Amendment approach, States would
still be able to defend this practice by showing a compelling state in-
terest and that the prohibition was narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.
This argument is parallel to, but slightly different from, the argu-
ment made in Runyon, discussed above. 153 In Runyon, the Supreme
149. TsEsIs, supra note 119, at 124.
150. Id. at 126.
151. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Powell all offering concurring opinions); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 62 (1973) (Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Douglas, and Justice
Marshall dissenting).
152. See, for example, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Plyler stating, "This conclu-
sion is fully consistent with Rodriguez. The Court there reserved judgment on the constitu-
tionality of a state system that 'occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities
to any of its children . . . .'" 457 U.S. at 235.
153. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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Court found that private schools were prohibited from discriminating
on the basis of race because of a federal statute prohibiting race-based
discrimination in the "making and enforcement of contracts," includ-
ing contracts for educational services. 154 The underlying federal stat-
ute was found constitutional-under the Thirteenth Amendment-
because it was passed to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery,
including prohibitions on African Americans making contracts. 155 In
the Plyler context, the argument would be that state (not private) ac-
tion is unconstitutional because it interferes with the fundamental
right of parental autonomy in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. Beyond "Badges and Incidents": Using a Holistic Thirteenth
Amendment Approach for Moral Suasion and
Organizing
Although the argument can be made that the prohibition of edu-
cation to the children of undocumented workers is prohibited under
the conservative approaches put forth by Tsesis and Carter, there is a
benefit to analyzing the issue under the broader holistic view as well.
We focus on the Thirteenth Amendment as prohibiting infringements
of rights at the intersection of citizenship, workers', human, and civil
rights. That intersection is present because the institution of slavery,
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, historically involved the
degradation of all of those rights.
This approach has several advantages in a litigation strategy. In
terms of the involuntary servitude portion of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, it eliminates the difficulty of defining exactly when workers feel
unable to quit ajob because of coercion. In regard to the slavery por-
tion of the Amendment, it removes the problems of determining
which rights are fundamental or sufficiently linked to the history of
chattel slavery. More importantly, however, the holistic approach is
particularly useful as a tool of moral suasion because it places the
treatment of undocumented workers and their families within the
context of human rights. In addition, from an organizing perspective,
it suggests a specific mechanism for bringing together several differ-
ent advocacy groups.
154. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
155. Id.
Spring 2008] THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
1. Moral Suasion
The Thirteenth Amendment provides a moral language to ad-
dress issues of undocumented workers and their children. By using
the language of the Thirteenth Amendment, especially the holistic ap-
proach's expansive interpretation, society can begin to think about
the rights of undocumented workers and their children as workers'
rights, human rights, and civil rights. It gives us a way to address the
issues beyond issues of sovereignty and immigration. This approach
fits with the international approach to viewing a child's right to educa-
tion as a right which exists at the intersection of these various impor-
tant rights. Professors Connie de la Vega and David Weissbrodt state
that the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in its General Comment 11, notes that
education can be classified as an economic right, a social right, and
a cultural right, but in many ways it is also a civil and political right,
since it is central to the full and effective realization of those rights
as well. It epitomizes the indivisibility and interdependence of all
human rights. 1 5 6
A child's right to education is guaranteed in almost every impor-
tant international human rights treaty.157 The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights states, "Everyone has the right to education. Educa-
tion shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages." 158 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, Article 13 agrees that "[t]he State Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education." 15 9 The Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child declares, "Parties recognize the
right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity." 160 Treaties clari-
156. DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 170
(Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., ed., 2007).
157. See KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT TO EDUC. AND
UNESCO ASIA & PAC. REG'L BUREAU FOR EDUC., MANUAL ON RIGHTS-BASED EDUCATION:
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS REQUIREMENTS MADE SIMPLE 3-5 (2004), available at http://www.
hrea.org/erc/Library/display-doc.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hrea.org%2Ferc%2FLi-
brary%2Fmanual-rightsbased.pdf&external=n; see also C. Raj Kumar, International Human
Rights Perspectives on the Fundamental Right to Education-Integration of Human Rights and
Human Development in the Indian Constitution, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237, 251-54
(2004); Human Rights Educ. Assocs., Right to Education, http://www.hrea.org/index.
php?baseid=144 (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
158. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
159. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
160. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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fying that countries may not discriminate in the provision of educa-
tion are found in the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination 61 and The International Conven-
tion on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their
Families. 162 That latter Convention assures that "each child of a mi-
grant worker shall have the basic right of access to education on the
basis of equality of treatment with nationals" and prohibits lack of ac-
cess due to the "irregular situation" of a child or parent. 163 Indeed,
these treaty obligations provide another basis, on grounds that paral-
lel the holistic approach of the Thirteenth Amendment, to recognize
a federal duty to ensure the children of undocumented workers access
to basic education.1 64
2. Organizing
From an organizing standpoint, conceiving the education issue in
broad Thirteenth Amendment terms provides a concrete connection
to advocacy groups focusing on labor rights, human rights, and civil
rights. Recognizing the linkages between the various groups currently
representing workers' rights (traditionally organized labor), citizen-
ship rights (immigrant rights groups), human rights (those working
with enslaved or trafficked workers), and civil rights (groups address-
ing the systemic deprivation of rights caused by membership in a ra-
cial or ethnic minority) enhances social mobilization and
organization.165 Significant strides have already been made in uniting
labor and immigrant rights groups to fight abusive governmental ac-
tion taken by the government against immigrant workers. 166 That ef-
fort has included lawsuits filed by labor unions seeking to protect the
constitutional rights of documented and undocumented workers, aris-
ing out of workplace immigration raids that had particularly detri-
161. Article 5 requires that state parties agree to principles of nondiscrimination in the
enjoyment of the right to education. International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
162. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
163. Id.
164. For an interesting article that uses these treaty provisions as an enforcement
model and surveys the possibility of a federal right to education, see Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. R~v. 1653 (2007).
165. For more on social mobilization and organizational implications of the holistic
vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, see Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Rights and the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 16 NEw LAB. FORUM 26 (2007).
166. Maria L. Ontiveros, Out of the Shadows and into the Spotlight: Immigrants and Organ-
ized Labor, 11 WORaINGUSA 157 (2008).
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mental effects on the families of the workers. 167 The education issue
provides an opportunity to emphasize the connection between organ-
ized labor, immigrant rights groups, and those groups concerned with
human rights and civil rights. A holistic Thirteenth Amendment ap-
proach provides a common language for these various groups because
it illustrates how the denial of education was central to the denial of
civil and human rights of slaves and shows how it threatens the civil
and human rights of immigrant workers today.
IV. Conclusion
Plyler remains a vital piece of Supreme Court jurisprudence en-
suring that no segment of our society is relegated to an inferior class.
Presently, no child may be denied that basic means by which we all
participate in society and by which we all better ourselves, our fami-
lies, and our communities.
As this Article demonstrates, there are reasons to remain cau-
tious. There have been legislative attempts to undo Plyler, as well as
opposition at the most local levels. Further, the Supreme Court is not
immovable.
This Article presents the Thirteenth Amendment as a potential
buttress to those who believe the Constitution guarantees undocu-
mented children the right to an education. It demonstrates the viabil-
ity of a Thirteenth Amendment argument under a conservative
framework, and argues that a broader vision of the Amendment more
accurately reflects its true nature while offering strategic advantages in
litigation. This Article also suggests that recognizing the Thirteenth
Amendment's position at the intersection of citizenship, workers',
human, and civil rights creates a tool for moral suasion and advocacy
organizing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Plyler recognized that a blunt
assertion of immigration policies should not render the Constitution
irrelevant to a broad segment of our established populace. Indeed,
when put in these straightforward terms, when viewed through a wide
lens, the outcome is clear. In this situation, the relevant constitutional
provisions include both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
While some fail to recognize that the conditions one would consider
indicative of slavery have continued to emerge since the abolition of
chattel slavery, this Article seeks to awaken advocates to those realities
by recognizing the Thirteenth Amendment's current relevance. Such
167. Id.
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awareness can encourage a wider dialogue in society generally. As peo-
ple realize the Amendment is not limited to the prohibition of chattel
slavery, they can begin to see how denying their neighbor's child ac-
cess to education reflects the type of iniquity they thought relegated
to the pages of history.
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